In the paper [2] a hierarchy of modal logics have been defined to capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in that hierarchy were distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to Medvedev's logic of (in)finite problems it has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. However, the infinite case remained open. In this paper we prove that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by standard Borel spaces (these cover probability spaces that occur in most of the applications) is also not finitely axiomatizable.
Introduction and background
Bayes logics have been introduced in the recent paper [2] in order to investigate (modal) logical properties of statistical inference (Bayesian belief revision). If (X, B, p) is a probability space, then elements of B can be regarded as propositions or possible statements about the world, and the probability measure p describes knowledge of statistical information (or say, it represents degree of beliefs in the truth of these propositions). Learning proposition A ∈ B to be true means revising the probability measure p on the basis of the evidence A, and replacing p by some other probability q in certain ways. The transition from p to q is statistical inference: This new probability measure q can be regarded as the probability measure that one infers from p on the basis of the information (evidence) that A is true. A fundamental model of statistical inference is the standard Bayes model which relies on Bayes conditionalization of probabilities: given a prior probability measure p and an evidence A ∈ B the inferred measure q is defined by conditionalizing p upon A using Bayes' rule:
provided p(A) = 0. The paper [2] aimed at studying the logical aspects of this type of inference from the perspective of modal logic.
1 is the disjoint union of X and Y ; A + B is the σ-algebra generated by A ∪ B and p + q is the probability measure r ·p+(1−r)·q. (If we would like to make r explicit, we write p+ r q). It follows that any standard probability space is isomorphic (modulo zero) to
where N, ℘(N), p is an arbitrary probability space (as p might not be faithful, this covers the finite case as well).
Let us introduce the following notation F n = M (X, ℘(X)), R(X, ℘(X)) , where X = {1, . . . , n}
F ω = M (X, ℘(X)), R(X, ℘(X)) , where X = N
similar to what we consider here can be (and have been) asked regarding these other types of inference rules (cf. [2, 3] ), but taking the first steps we stick to the basic case of Bayesian inference here.
Note that if the measurable space X, B is finite or countable, then B is the full powerset algebra ℘(X) (we rely on the convention that elementary events {x} for x ∈ X always belong to the algebra B).
Definition 1.2 (Bayes logics)
. A family of normal modal logics have been defined in [2] based on finite or countable or countably infinite or all Bayes frames as follows.
We call BL <ω (resp. BL ≤ω ) the logic of finite (resp. countable) Bayes frames; however, observe that the set of possible worlds M (X, B) of a Bayes frame F(X, B) is finite if and only if X is a one-element set, otherwise it is at least of cardinality continuum.
BL <ω is the set of general laws of Bayesian learning based on all finite Bayes frames. The general laws of Bayesian learning independent of the particular representation X, B of the events is then the modal logic BL.
The following theorem has been proved in [2] (see Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 4.1 therein).
The finite Bayes frame case has been completely described in [2] and, in particular, it has been shown that BL <ω has the finite frame property and is not finitely axiomatizable (see Propositions 5.8, 5.9 in [2] ), but the infinite case remained almost completely open.
In this paper we deal with Bayes frames F(X, B), where X, B is a standard Borel space (such frames we will refer to as standard Borel Bayes frames). This covers the finite and countably infinite cases (e.g. BL <ω and BL ω ) but is more general because the uncountably infinite space 
• M, w ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w ϕ AND M, w ψ.
• M, w ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w ϕ.
• M, w ♦ϕ ⇐⇒ there is v such that wRv and M, v ϕ.
Formula ϕ is valid over a frame F (F ϕ in symbols) if and only if it is true at every point in every model based on the frame. For a class C of frames the modal logic of C is the set of all modal formulas that are valid on every frame in C:
Λ(C) is always a normal modal logic. Let us recall the most standard list of modal axioms (frame properties) that are often considered in the literature (cf.
[1] and [4] ).
Basic frame properties Name Formula Corresponding frame property
order property not to be covered here
For two frames F = W, R and G = W , R we write F G if F is (isomorphic as a frame to) a generated subframe of G. We recall that if
(see Theorem 3.14 in [1]). If w ∈ W , then we write F w to denote the subframe of F generated by w, and we call such subframes point-generated subframes. Further, let F G denote a surjective, bounded morphism (sometimes called p-morphisms). Such morphisms preserve the accessibility relation and have the zig-zag property (see
A method for non-finite axiomatizability
We start by recalling definitions and theorems from [11] and [2] . Medvedev's logic of finite problems and its extension to infinite problems by Skvortsov originate in intuitionistic logic. (For an overview we refer to the book [4] and to Shehtman [11] ; Medvedev's logic of finite problems is covered in the papers [9, 12, 10, 11, 8, 6] ).
Definition 2.1 (Medvedev frame).
A Medvedev frame is a frame that is isomorphic (as a directed graph) to P 0 (X) = ℘(X) {∅}, ⊇ for a non-empty finite set X.
Medvedev's logic ML <ω is the modal logic that corresponds to the Medvedev frames:
A Skvortsov frame is defined in the same way except with X is a non-empty set of any cardinality.
We denote the corresponding Skvortsov logics by ML α for sets X of cardinality α. It has been proved (see Theorem 2.2 in [12] ) that
As a slight abuse of notation we will use the term Medvedev frame for any frame of the form P 0 (X) (thus X need not be finite here 
To gain not finite axiomatizability results we follow the method presented in Shehtman [11] and we recall the most important lemmas that we make use of.
Lemma 2.3 (cf. Proposition 4 in [11]
). Let F be a generated finite S4-frame. Then there is a modal formula χ(F) with the following properties:
(A) For any S4-frame G we have G χ(F) if and only if ∃u G u F.
Not finite axiomatizability of the logic of finitary Boolean frames
Let F = W, ≤ be a finite ordering (partially ordered set) and pick x ∈ W . y is an immediate successor of x if x < y and there is no x < z < y. (As usual < means ≤ ∩ =). The branch index
is the cardinality of the set of immediate successors of x, and the depth d F (x) is the least upper bound of cardinalities of chains in F whose least element is x. Thus, d F (x) = 1 means that
x has no immediate successors. We adopt Lemma 17 in [11] in a slightly more general setting:
Definition 2.9. Let B ⊆ P(X) be a Boolean algebra of subsets of X such that all finite subsets of X are contained in B. A frame isomorphic to B 0 = B {∅}, ⊇ is called a finitary Boolean frame.
The connection with Medvedev frames is transparent: for any set X the frames P 0 (X) = ℘(X) {∅}, ⊇ are finitary Boolean frames. Note that any point-generated subframe of B 0 is also a finitary Boolean frame.
Lemma 2.10. Let B 0 be a finitary Boolean frame and let F be a finite, point-generated ordering
Proof.
F is a surjective bounded morphism. We show first that for all x ∈ F there is a set
We proceed by induction. The case 
As x 1 and x 2 are immediate successors, the only element h(A x ) that can satisfy the equations
To complete the proof pick an arbitrary x ∈ F and a set A ∈ B 0 such that h(A) = x and
. As A is finite we can assume that A is as small as possible: there is no B ⊆ A such
, thus it suffices to show that
. Take an immediate successor y of x. Then there is B ⊆ A such that h(B) = y.
B is contained in an immediate successor C of A, and as B ⊆ C ⊆ A holds, we have h(C) is either x or y. But it cannot be x, because of the minimality of A. Therefore, with any immediate successor of x we can associate an immediate successor of A. This completes the proof. Proof. We intend to apply Corollary 2.8. It is straightforward that the reverse-Boolean ordering ⊇ is transitive and reflexive, therefore B 0 is an S4-frame (i.e. S4 ⊆ L).
Next, let us verify that L ⊆ ML <ω . To this end it is enough to prove B 0 P 0 (N) as in this case L ⊆ Λ(P 0 (N)) = ML ω ⊆ ML <ω . As B 0 is infinite, there are countably infinite many pairwise disjoint elements a i ∈ B 0 (i ∈ N) such that i ∈ Na i = X. The idea is to extend the mapping a i → i to a bounded morphism. Define f :
Then f (X) = N and f (a i ) = {i}. We claim that f is a surjective bounded morphism.
Surjectivity: For a non-empty
Homomorphism: Suppose for a, b ∈ B 0 we have a ⊇ b. Then whenever b ∩ a i = ∅ we also have
Zig-zag property: Suppose f (a) = A and A ⊇ B = ∅. We need to find a b with a ⊇ b and
Finally, to fulfill all requirements of Corollary 2.8 we show that for all u ∈ B 0 we have
As point-generated subframes of B 0 are also finitary Boolean frames, the result follows from Corollary 2.11.
Not finite axiomatizability of the logic of certain measure algebra frames
Suppose X, B, w is a probability space. Two measurable sets A and B are said to be w-equivalent, A ∼ w B in symbols (when it is clear we omit w from the subscript), if the w-measure of their symmetric difference is 0. ∼ is a congruence on the Boolean σ-algebra B and thus we can consider the quotient structure B/ ∼ which also is a σ-complete Boolean algebra with the quotient operations. There is a straightforward connection with Medvedev frames: the set of possible worlds of a Medvedev frame is ℘(X) {∅} for some (finite) set X. ℘(X) is a Boolean algebra, thus we can think of the possible worlds of a Medvedev frame as the structure that results when we cut out the least element of a Boolean algebra. We did the same thing in case of finitary Boolean frames (Definition 2.9) and we do something similar here: we take the Boolean algebra B/ ∼ and cut out its least element. If X is a finite set, then every subset of X is measurable, thus B = ℘(X). Take now a faithful probability measure w over B. Then no proper subsets of X are ∼ w equivalent, therefore B/ ∼ is (isomorphic to) ℘(X). Consequently, the Medvedev frame P 0 (X) and the measure algebra frame M(X, B, w) are isomorphic when X is finite. For infinite X the connection is more Lemma 2.14. If M is a measure algebra frame and a ∈ M, then the generated subframe M a is also a measure algebra frame.
Proof. Pick any M = M(X, B, w) and an element a ∈ M. There is A ∈ B such that A/ ∼w = a.
Measurable subsets of A are exactly the sets in B A = {A ∩ B : B ∈ B} and v(·) = w(· | A) is a probability measure on B A. It is not hard to see that the generated subframe M a is isomorphic to M(A, B A, v).
For the second statement we only have to note that for a Lebesgue measurable
Proof. Write L = Λ(M). We intend to apply Corollary 2.8; the first part of the proof is almost identical to that of Corollary 2.12. It is straightforward that the reverse-Boolean ordering ≥ is transitive and reflexive, therefore M is an S4-frame (i.e. S4 ⊆ L).
Next, we verify L ⊆ ML <ω . It is enough to prove M P 0 (N) as in this case L ⊆ Λ(P 0 (N)) = ML ω ⊆ ML <ω . As M is infinite, there are countably infinite many pairwise disjoint elements
We claim that f is a surjective bounded morphism.
Surjectivity: For a non-empty A ⊆ N we have f ( i∈A a i ) = A.
Homomorphism: Suppose for a, b ∈ M we have a ≥ b. Then whenever b ∧ a i = 0 we also have a ∧ a i = 0, therefore
Zig-zag property: Suppose f (a) = A and A ⊇ B = ∅. We need to find a b with a ≥ b and
Finally, to fulfill all requirements of Corollary 2.8 we prove that for all u ∈ M we have
As generated subframes of measure algebra frames are measure algebra frames (Lemma 2.14) it is enough to prove that M C(k, 2 k ).
Suppose, seeking a contradiction, that there is f :
λ(B) > 0} and let N be the frame N = L + , ⊇ . The mapping f can be lifted up to a surjective
. To complete the proof we would like to apply Corollary 2.11, but the problem is that N is not a finitary Boolean frame as finite subsets of [0, 1] has λ-measure zero. Therefore, we need to further extend f + as follows. Let A be a non-empty Lebesgue measurable set and suppose {A i } i∈N is a sequence of positive measure sets (A i ∈ L + ) such that A i ⊇ A i+1 modulo measure zero and A = i∈N A i . Then define F (A) = sup {Ai} i∈N lim i f + (A i ). For every such sequence {A i } the limit exists as C(k, 2 k ) is finite and f + (A i ) ≤ f + (A i+1 ). If two sequences {A i } and {B i } give a different limit, then {A i ∩ B i } yields a greater (or equal) limit as f
It follows that the supremum always exists. Denote the frame extended with elements of such form by N = L , ⊇ , where
It is straightforward to verify that F : N C(k, 2 k ) is a surjective bounded morphism.
To complete the proof observe that each finite subset can be obtained in the form i∈N A i :
Therefore the frame N is a finitary Boolean frame, thus Corollary 2.11 implies that there is no bounded morphism N C(k, 2 k ).
This contradicts to F being such a bounded morphism.
Suppose X is a finite or countably infinite set and consider the probability space X, ℘(X), w for some probability measure w. We can assume that w is faithful, otherwise we would switch to a smaller X. As noted above M(X, ℘(X), w) is isomorphic to the Medvedev frame P 0 (X).
Consider now the probability space whose underlying set is [0, 1] ∪ X, its σ-algebra is the algebra generated by L ∪ ℘(X) and the probability measure is ν = r · λ + (1 − r) · w for some r ∈ (0, 1).
Denote the corresponding measure algebra frame by
(By replacing L with B we obtain the same measure algebra frame). 
Standard Bayes logic is not finitely axiomatizable
Recall (from the Introduction) that every standard probability space is isomorphic (modulo zero)
to N + [0, 1], ℘(N) + L, p + λ , where N, ℘(N), p is an arbitrary probability space. w ∈ F the generated subframe F w is isomorphic to M(X, B, w).
Proof. As F w is generated by w, for any u ∈ F w there is a non w-measure zero set A u such that u(·) = w(· | A u ). This A u is unique up to w-measure zero equivalence: if A u ∼ w A u , then w(· | A u ) = w(· | A u ). Therefore u can be identified with the element A u / ∼ ∈ B/ ∼ . Indeed, let f be the mapping f : F w → B/ ∼ {∅/ ∼ } defined by f (u) = A u / ∼ . (In particular f (w) = X/ ∼ which is the top element of the Boolean algebra B/ ∼ , i.e. the element which generates M). It is fairly easy to check that f is an isomorphism between the frames F and M. Proof. Let L = Λ(F (X, B) ). We intend to apply Corollary 2.8. We already know that S4 ⊆ L ⊆ ML <ω (cf. Theorem 1.3) thus we only need to see that for any k and every u ∈ F we have F u C(k, 2 k ). By Lemma 3.2 we know that F u is isomorphic to M(X, B, u). But as X, B is a standard Borel space, the probability space X, B, u is also standard (more precisely, the completion of it is standard), therefore it is isomorphic modulo zero to N + [0, 1], ℘(N) + L, p + λ for some p. Lemma 3.1 states there is no bounded morphism M(N+[0, 1], ℘(N)+L, p+λ) C(k, 2 k ), which completes the proof.
